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TORTS-ASSUMPTION OF RisK-A California Court of Appeals has held
that a person's status as a trespasser is now largely immaterial and no
longer determines that he assumed the risk of personal injuries caused
by a possessor's negligence.
Beard v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, 4 Cal.
App. 3d 130, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1970).
When returning home from school, plaintiff, a fourteen year old junior
high school student of average or slightly-below average intelligence,
crossed defendant railroad's right-of-way. A slow-moving (10-15 miles
per hour) freight train came along. Plaintiff ran alongside the train,
grasped the handle bar at the end of a box car, and attempted to pull
himself aboard. According to plaintiff, as he placed his feet on the sill
step of the box car, the step wobbled, gave way and he fell beneath
the wheels of the train. The railroad's right-of-way was posted with
"Keep Out" signs. Three of the five man crew were charged with the
duty to watch for persons attempting to board the train. There was
testimony that, at the point of the accident, hopping and riding of the
train by school children was an almost daily occurrence. The sill steps
had been visually inspected by the conductor before the run on which
the accident happened. That evening, an experienced car inspector
checked every step on one side of the train with a flashlight and found
no defects.'
An action was brought in the trial court on two counts. The first
count was based on negligence and the second count on the Federal
Safety Appliance Act.2 Because plaintiff was not a person to whom a
cause of action had been given by the Safety Appliance Act, defendant's
motion before trial for a summary judgment was granted on the second
count. At trial, defendant's motion for a nonsuit on the first count was
granted at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case.3
Between the trial court's decision and the appeal, the Supreme Court
of California had decided Rowland v. Christian.4 In this case, California
abolished the old tests for standard of care owed to a trespasser, licensee,
or invitee, and established a single new test based on ordinary principles
of negligence. 5 The trial court applied the existing doctrine espoused
1. Beard v. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 134, 84
Cal. Rptr. 449, 452 (1970).
2. Safety Appliance Act of 1910, § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 11 (1965).
3. 4 Cal. App. 3d at 134, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
4. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
5. Id.
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by the Restatement,6 and took the view that the plaintiff had the bur-
den to establish that because of his youth he did not realize and ap-
preciate the risk of boarding a moving freight train. However, under
Rowland, the liability of a possessor of property to trespassing children
is no longer limited by this section of the Restatement, or by the terms
of other special doctrines and theories created as exceptions to a gen-
eral rule barring trespassers from recovery for negligence. A land-
owner's liability is now governed by Civil Code, section 1714, 7 which
imposes general liability on every person for injuries occasioned to
others by negligence in the management of his property.
A possessor's duty is controlled by the foreseeability of the risk and
not by the status of the person injured.8 Consequently, the various ex-
ceptions to the former rule prohibiting trespassers from recovery for
negligence no longer serve their intended purposes. A trespassing child
does not have to rebut the presumption that as a trespasser he assumed
the risk. The burden of proving assumption of risk remains on the
defendant.
The court's analysis of the factual situation in Beard raised the issue
of assumption of risk. Courts have traditionally disagreed as to the
scope of this doctrine; whether it should be confined to contractual
relations between parties; or whether it should be applied to any situa-
tion in which an action might be brought for negligence.9 Some au-
thority recognizes assumption of risk in its implied form as a separate
defense, 10 while other authority holds that there is no assumption of
risk doctrine separate from contributory negligence."
One authority12 sets forth the proposition that there are two types
of assumption of risk. These two theories are designated "primary"
assumption of risk, which is only the counterpart of the defendant's
lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that risk; and "secondary"
assumption of risk which occurs when a plaintiff deliberately assumes
a risk created by defendant's breach of duty toward him. Plaintiffs who
unreasonably assume the risk in this "second sense" are barred from
recovery, while in the "primary sense" a reasonable plaintiff would
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
7. WEST'S ANN. CIV. CODE § 1714 (1954).
8. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
9. Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5
(1961).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496 A-496G (1965).
11. McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 15 Wisc. 2d 374,
' 113 N.W. 2d 14, 16 (1962).
12. James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
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be precluded from recovery. The determination of what a court should
do when a plaintiff reasonably encouters a risk in the "second sense"
could play an important part in the resolution of such problems as
are raised in Beard.
In the instant case the California courts, contrary to movements in
some other states, 13 maintained the view that the defenses of assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence are separate and distinct.14
The assumption of risk question in Beard would fall into either the
"second sense" pattern as explained above, or the area where a plain-
tiff reasonably but voluntarily encountered a risk. The court in apply-
ing Rowland, which held that landowners owed a duty to trespassers,'15
removed the presumption that the plaintiff assumed the risk. The
burden of proving that the plaintiff assumed the risk is on the defen-
dant. To establish his prima facie case, the plaintiff must only prove
the standard elements of a cause of action for negligence, 6 rather than
go through the process of tediously fitting conduct into the pigeonholes
supplied by the theory of the Restatement. 7 This is an honest ap-
proach to the problems of negligence and one for which the court
should be commended. However, it is submitted that the court's solu-
tion to the problem of assumption of risk was not complete.
The defendant, in order to absolve himself from liability, under
the assumption of risk doctrine as laid out by the court in Beard, must
"establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) plaintiff's conscious
assumption of the risk, which in the case of a juvenile encompasses his
capacity to realize and appreciate the risk, and (2) the risk which plain-
tiff assumed was the one which proximately caused his injury."' 8
It appears that this test now subjects the defendant to the weaknesses
of the test formally forced on the plaintiff. If this is true, it is sub-
mitted, that this test now encumbent on the defendant will prove just
as wooden as tests formerly required of plaintiffs under the Restate-
13. Smith, The Last Days of Assumption of The Risk, 5 GONZAGA L. REV. 190 (1969-
1970); Farnam, Assumption of Risk Bites the Dust in Idaho--Almost, 6 IDAHo L. REV.
119 (1969).
14. Prescott v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, - , 265 P.2d 904, 906 (1954).
15. For the view that applying Rowland to trespassers is dictum see Toomepuu, Torts-
Trespassers and Licensees-Elimination of Common Law Classifications, 49 B.U.L. REv.
198 (1969).
16. W. PROSSR, ToRTs § 30, at 146 (3d ed. 1964).
17. For a trespassing child to rebut the presumption that he did not assume the risk
at the time of the Beard trial, it was necessary under the attractive nuisance doctrine to fill
the conditions imposed by RESTATEmENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 339 (1965).
18. Beard, citing Vierra v. Fifth Avenue Rental Service, 60 Cal. 2d 266, 271, 383 P.2d
777, 32 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1963).
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ment.19 In addition, the problem remains of what to do with a plain-
tiff who voluntarily, but reasonably, assumes a risk.
In order to illustrate this problem, assume that on remand the trial
court found the following situation to be present:
The fourteen year old plaintiff is found by the jury not to be contri-
butorily negligent,20 because the probability of an accident resulting
from a negligently maintained sill step is not so great as to be that type
of hazard about which one must worry. The jury further found the
railroad to be negligent in their maintenance of the sill step, but that
the plaintiff assumed the risk. This latter determination is based on
plaintiff's prior knowledge of a person having been injured on a train's
broken sill step. The court now would have the problem of a plaintiff
who, while acting reasonably, was injured by a defendant who acted
unreasonably. Should the fact that plaintiff knew he might be hurt
absolve the defendant from all liability?21
One solution is to do away with the doctrine of assumption of risk.22
However, the California Court has not done so and has not eliminated
the problem as a matter of law. The Beard court held that a fourteen
year old by testifying that "he did not know, and had not been told,
that hopping on a moving freight train was dangerous, '23 presented
a question of fact on the issue of assumption of risk for the jury. This
holding could go a long way towards solving the problem in an indirect
way. The jury when faced with this situation, that the law has not
effectively handled, will not be caught up in the classification of as-
sumption of risk. When presented with a reasonable but voluntary
plaintiff, and an unreasonable defendant, the jury will balance the
scales and reach an equitable solution.
Charles J. Fonzone
19. The plaintiff in Beard was required to fill all the conditions in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
20. The Beard court indicates such a result is entirely possible. See 4 Cal. App. 3d at
139, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (1970).
21. For interesting views on this issue see Mansfield, Informed Choice In The Law of
Torts, 22 LA. L. REv. 17 (1961).
22. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
23. 4 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 455 (1970).
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